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ands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the partisan motives behin
This paper examines a voter model for the US which is interconnected with the partisan theory. In our model, voters are rational and forward-looking. They are perfectly informed about the preferences of political parties and about the state of the economy. The predictions of our voter model differ f
In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y.
In a recent article, Zaleski does not find any clear difference between the political preferences of Republican and Democratic administrations with respect to the choice between unemployment and inflation. This paper provides empirical support for the opposite conclusion in a generalization of Zales
Explores the implications of imperfect monetary control and uncertainty about the trade-off between output and inflation to discretionary policy. Impact of imperfect control of money growth on policymakers' incentive to create surprises; Consequences of imperfect control of money growth for optimal
In this paper optimal control techniques are applied to estimate the motives behind US fiscal macroeconomic policy. Starting from a range of possible objectives and given the perception of policy makers about the environment in which they operate, the priorities of policy makers are estimated on the
This paper reports on the results of an empirical study of relationships between the popularity of US presidents and economic variables. Traditionally, these relationships are based on the hypothesis that voters hold the incumbent President responsible for the economic situation. We derive an altern
In this paper a model is constructed which enables the determination of wage rigidity in the United States. In this model wage changes result from a confrontation of intended and actual wage changes. In such a process expected prices obviously play an important role. For this reason the model is est
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