| Titel | Transparency and Pre-meetings |
|---|---|
| Auteur | Swank, J. (Job); Swank, O.H. (Otto); Visser, B. (Bauke) |
| Datum | 2006-05-29 |
| Trefwoord(en) | transparency, reputational concerns, committees, pre-meetings |
| Taal | Engels |
| Type | working paper |
| Samenvatting | Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal ‘premeeting’; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings. |
| Publicatie | http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7814 |
| Persistent Identifier | urn:NBN:nl:ui:15-1765/7814 |
| Metadata | XML |
| Repository | Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam |
Omhoog
Ga terug naar de inhoud
Ga terug naar de site navigatie