Explaining European decision making: testing procedural models
09 / 1999 - 09 / 2004
This project's purpose is to compare and to test game-theoretic procedure-oriented models which have been developed to explain legislative decision making in the European Union. The research question is: What are the effects of the institutional arrangements of the European Union on resulting legislation? Formal theory will be augmented by statistical techniques. This will demonstrate in which way the power of the European Union's institutional actors to influence the legislative outcome in the European Union depends on the formal procedure which is being used to negotiate a particular piece of legislation. The different game-theoretic models will be tested against a set of 80 recent legislative proposals which cover a substantial share of the policy sectors dealt with by the European Union. The statistical testing will produce different predictions which will then be compared with the actual outcome of the legislative decision making processes under consideration. A set of case studies will be employed to illuminate and to support the statistical argument. "