The programme focuses (1) on rationality in two of its aspects (rationality as such and scientific rationality), (2) on consciousness and (3) on interpretation and inference. The three themes are intertwined and many members of the group work in two of the fields. Epistemologically, the spirit of the programme is naturalistic and ontologically it is non-reductionist. That is to say that in an analysis of (many) philosophical problems the use of empirical data it is deemed appropriate, and that there is a tendency to acknowledge the complexity of ontology rather than to favour a reductionist explication. Both these methodological positions themselves (naturalism and non-reductionism) have become topics of research. 1. Rationality The analysis of rationality concentrates on what is a good reason for believing something. It inevitably leads to the question what it is to believe, and thus this topic relates to the cognitive science problems of domain (II) and to issues related to propositional attitudes and inference (III). In a non-reductive vein the introduction of (objective) chances is thought to be crucial for a satisfactory normative analysis of reasons for believing. Beside the normative question as to what is a good reason, the question of the actual performance of human reasoning (inference) and its natural limits (natural rationality) is addressed, providing another bridge between (I) on the one hand and (II) and (III) on the other. The discussion of scientific rationality focuses on the (purported) rationality of scientific practice. It takes issue with the tendency to reduce this rationality to a relativistic or sociological category. The main debate is about what reasons scientists have to believe in theoretical entities (against the anti-realism of Van Fraassen). The underlying concern is what, without such reasons, remains of the rationality of searching for these postulated theoretical entities. Recently we have begun to explore what a Peircean pragmatic approach has to offer here. Another recent point of focus is the issue of scientific realism as applied to the cognitive sciences. A stand is taken against reductive approaches in psychology (e.g. against Bechtel). 2. Consciousness; Reductive physicalist approaches to consciousness are felt to leave out the phenomenal side of consciousness. The programme argues on the one hand that phenomenal, experiential consciousness cannot be accounted for on a sub-personal level of description. On the other hand, however, models are developed for the interrelation of the personal and sub-personal level of description that do acknowledge the fact that e.g. the physical brain is a necessary prerequisite for phenomenal consciousness. The current research is directed at establishing the compatibility of (1) the non-reducibility of the phenomenal to the physical and (2) the necessity of the physical for the phenomenal. Within the second domain the non-reductionist vein of the programme shows up in the critique of the physicalist tradition that views self-consciousness as a sophisticated, self-monitoring module in the human brain, closely linked to language (cf. (III)). Contrary to this view of self-consciousness, an ecological approach is argued for. The self is primarily a bodily self in an environment, and should neither be reduced to (a part of) the brain (as against physicalism), nor to a completely non-material entity. Our naturalistic approach makes itself felt within the domain of cognition as our belief that without careful attention to the (fascinating) empirical facts a philosophical study of cognitive topics such as colours, personal identity and depth perception is bound to miss the point. These empirical facts crucially figure in the argument in favour of the philosophical position defended. For example, psychological data from depth perception help to argue a case against philosophical relativism. 3. Interpretation and inference: The issue of reasons leads to the issue of agency, which immediately returns to the issue of rationality, thus providing a strong link between domains (I) and (III). For in trying to understand the beliefs and actions of an agent, i.e. in trying to interpret his beliefs and actions, including his linguistic actions, the question is whether we have to assume his rationality as a default position (Davidson, Dennett). Taking a naturalistic stance we argue that interpretationalism (with rationality as presupposition) fails to acknowledge the empirical facts of irrational agents whose actions are quite understandable. Rather than spinning a priori theories, careful attention should be given to the empirical facts involved in interpretation. In the theory of presuppositions developed, interpretation of linguistic and non-linguistic acts is viewed as an inferential process, which involves all sorts of inferences (logical consequence, presupposition, implicature, and so on). It is maintained that inferences themselves, especially the ones accessible to consciousness (II), are linguistic in nature: our species owes its logical prowess at least in part to the fact that we are a linguistic species and more particularly to the fact that we are adept at manipulating meaningful symbols. Therefore, a theory of human inference will have to be based, at least in part, on a theory of interpretation. Note further that the question whether an agent is rational is related to the question what his inferential capabilities are, thus providing a link with domain (I). Our approach to interpretation and inference is non-reductionist in the sense that we aim to describe and explain these phenomena on several levels, which are not reducible to each other (e.g. the levels of mental representation and denotational meaning).