The Feasibility of Cooperation under Various Sanctioning Institutions


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Title The Feasibility of Cooperation under Various Sanctioning Institutions
Period 01 / 2010 - unknown
Status Current
Dissertation Yes
Research number OND1346375
Data Supplier Website ICS


In recent years, many studies focused on the role of institutions providing selective incentives to support cooperation in public good dilemmas. In this project, we identify four aspects related to this topic that have received considerably less attention: the form of the sanctioning institution (for example, punishments versus rewards as selective incentives; costly fines vs exclusion from the group as punishments), the decision rule applied by the institution (for example, collective versus individual sanctions), the effects of sanctioning institutions on group solidarity, and the information about the contribution of other group members that is available to the individual. We propose a new set of experiments specifically designed to investigate these four aspects.

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Supervisor V.W. (Vincent) Buskens
Supervisor Prof.dr. W. Raub
Doctoral/PhD student N. van Miltenburg

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