<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><mods xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" version="3.2" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd"><titleInfo><title>Deal or No Deal? Decision-making under Risk in a Large-payoff Game Show</title></titleInfo><name><namePart>Post, G.T. (Thierry)</namePart></name><name><namePart>Baltussen, G. (Guido)</namePart></name><name><namePart>Assem, van den M.J. (Martijn)</namePart></name><subject lang="nl"><topic>decision making under risk</topic><topic>relative risk aversion</topic><topic>break-even effect</topic><topic>real incentives</topic><topic>game show</topic></subject><accessCondition></accessCondition><location><url>http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7230</url></location><language><languageTerm type="text">en</languageTerm></language><genre authority="local">document</genre><abstract>The popular television game show deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity for analyzing decision making under risk: it involves very large stakes, simple take-or-leave decisions that require minimal skill or strategy and near-certainty about the probability distribution. Based on a panel data set of the choices of contestants in all game rounds of 53 episodes from Australia and the Netherlands, we find an average Pratt-Arrow relative risk aversion (RRA) between roughly 1 and 2 for initial wealth levels between 0 and 50,000. The RRA differs substantially across the contestants and some even exhibit risk seeking behavior. The cross-sectional differences in RRA can be explained in large part by the previous outcomes experienced by the contestants during the game. Most notably, consistent with the break-even effect,the RRA strongly decreases following earlier losses and risk seeking arises after large losses.</abstract></mods>
