<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><mods xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" version="3.2" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-2.xsd"><titleInfo><title>Transparency and Pre-meetings</title></titleInfo><name><namePart>Swank, J. (Job)</namePart></name><name><namePart>Swank, O.H. (Otto)</namePart></name><name><namePart>Visser, B. (Bauke)</namePart></name><subject lang="nl"><topic>transparency</topic><topic>reputational concerns</topic><topic>committees</topic><topic>pre-meetings</topic></subject><accessCondition></accessCondition><location><url>http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7814</url></location><language><languageTerm type="text">en</languageTerm></language><genre authority="local">document</genre><abstract>Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to publish verbatim transcripts of their meetings: the emergence of an informal &#8216;premeeting&#8217;; the move of the real debate from the formal meeting to the premeeting; and the drop in disagreement in the formal meeting. We analyse what the effect is on accountability and quality of decision-making. Finally, we present evidence suggesting that our model describes the way members of the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States responded to the publication of verbatim transcripts of their meetings.</abstract></mods>
